

PLANNING URBAN SOCIAL SPACES AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS: THE CASE OF JERUSALEM

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Introduction

The literature on space and spatiality suggests that urban spaces are not fixed and self-contained but are rather relational, processual, dynamic, open, socially produced, and nested in a web of social relations (i.e., Healey, 2006; Jones & Jessop, 2010; Lefebvre, 1991). Such a perspective frames social spaces "as webs or networks with diverse morphologies, connecting people and events in one node to others near and far [...that] emerge as nodes in one or more networks" (Healey, 2006: 526). Following Laclau and Mouffe's (2014) conception of urban social spaces as discursive entities and Lacan's notion of fantasy (Lacan, 1997), our recent theoretical framework suggests that urban social spaces are located within a field of social relations in a 'war of position' (Jabareen & Eizenberg, 2021).

This paper excavates the role of planning in forming and defining the interrelations among social spaces and setting up the 'war of position' among them. We argue that spatial planning has a powerful role in constructing the interrelations among different urban social spaces and decreeing the nature of these relations as ranging from antagonistic and exclusionary to equivalent and inclusionary. Since there is no available methodology for such examination, we propose here a methodological framework to examine the contribution of spatial planning to the interrelations among different urban spaces.

The following section presents the proposed methodological framework. Then, the case study of planning Jerusalem is presented. The city of Jerusalem provides a rich empirical case due to the intensive planning efforts undertaken by the State of Israel and the city to manage and transform its contested spaces in the context of the harsh ethnic conflict among its main social groups, Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinians. The finding section is based on the review and analysis of several plans of Jerusalem since 1967, the year in which East Jerusalem was conquered by the State of Israel and then annexed to city. The final section presents the theorization and lessons regarding the 'dark' side of spatial planning (Yiftachel, 2006).

Methodology

We take advantage of the theoretical framework of understanding the interrelations among urban social spaces (Jabareen & Eizenberg, 2021) to propose a methodological framework aiming to capture the contribution of planning to the construction of the interrelations among urban social spaces. It is composed of three interrelated logics that structure the analysis of planning documents. The three logics are the logics of difference and equivalence borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe (2014) and the Lacanian conception of fantasy and imaginary logic.

1. The logic of difference: captures differentiations and divisions among spaces based on people's social categories. This socially oriented logic directs the focus of urban spaces analysis to the composition of different social groups (i.e., class, ethnicity, religion, race, color, education, culture, and other social differentiation). The logic of difference "assumes an essentialist meaning of difference; it defines groups as having different

natures" (Young, 1990: 157). Its application to plans helps grasp the divisions and limits of urban social spaces that intervene and effect processes whereby people differentiate themselves from other people and decide where to live. In this way, the logic of difference helps unravel the role of planning in constructing the categories of 'we,' 'others,' and uncover antagonism and tensions that characterize the process of socio-spatial configuration.

2. The logic of spatial equivalence: generates a relational equivalence in which differences in identity are accepted. It dissolves 'positive differences' and creates real spatial boundaries that include all the desired identities in opposition to "the Others." In the urban context, the logic of spatial equivalence dissolves some differential features among specific groups. Its first order defines the rules of those who should live together within a social space. It defines the social and the spatial frontier of antagonism by articulating who are excluded and are not part of the chain of social and spatial equivalence. Outside the chain of equivalence, marked by antagonistic lines, is everything that is excluded. Applying the logic of equivalence to plans unpacks how institutional planning perceives, constructs, and reinforces the chain of social and special equivalence through the practice of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

3. The imaginary logic: Building on the Lacanian concepts of ontological lack, fantasy, and desire, we propose the imaginary logic as the third prism for examining the role of planning in constructing urban social spaces and their interrelations. It helps explain how and why specific articulations and practices of spatial formation are constructed, maintained, and transformed. Lacan conceives lack as the foundation of human existence. According to Lacan, "the infant acquires its first sense of unity and identity, a spatial imaginary identity" (Stavrakakis, 1999: 17) that "proceed from a fragmented image of the body" in an effort to overcome the inherent failures and gaps - "the lack of being, properly speaking" (Lacan, 1997: 223). Fantasy, as a narrative, "covers-over or conceals the subject's lack by providing an image of fullness and wholeness on the one hand, while conjuring up threats and obstacles to its realization on the other" (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 130). Thus, the imaginary mode would "consist of those discursive forms" through which a society tries to institute itself as 'complete' and 'total' (Laclau, 1990: 92). Especially in a highly contested case as Jerusalem, "when harmony is not present, it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent," and "it has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction" (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–63).

Methodologically, we are looking at the plans of Jerusalem to understand the fantasy that these plans convey and construct. With this logic, we wish to expose the desires, articulated as visions, goals, objectives, and practices aiming to overcome intrinsic incompleteness. The imaginary logic helps capture the political drives of the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence. It is manifested through the construction of different dichotomies, mainly antagonism/sympathy, conflict/harmony, safe/dangerous, familiar/strange, anxiety/happiness, and risk/trust.

Case study: Planning Jerusalem

The 1948 War over Palestine resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel and the displacement and dispossession of some 780,000 Palestinians (Abu-Lughod, 1971). Israel occupied West Jerusalem whereas East Jerusalem fell under Jordanian rule. In the 1967 war, Israel occupied the east part of Jerusalem, annexed it, and incorporated approximately 70 km² into the already existing municipal structure of the Israeli city. This annexation, however, has never been recognized by the international community. In 1980, Israel endowed the annexation of East Jerusalem with constitutional status by enacting "Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel," formally declaring the "whole and united" area of East and West Jerusalem to be "the capital of Israel." Since the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel has strived to alter the social-spatial nature of Jerusalem to enhance its geopolitical control over the entire city. Yet, the Palestinians have resisted these policies and produce alternative modes of space production (Jabareen, 2010, 2017).

Jerusalem was selected as a case study for two reasons: first, for its deep ethnic conflict and rich mosaic of segregations between Jews and Palestinians, as well as, among Jews themselves (Bollens 2000).

Second, it has undertaken intensive institutional planning efforts since 1948 by the state of Israel (Jabareen, 2017). At the present, Jerusalem has a population about 951 thousand, 584 thousand Jews, and 367 thousand Palestinians (CBS, 2022).

Israel maintains a centralized land use planning system in which the central government exercises broad oversight over local-level planning decisions. The involvement of the central government is channeled through the hierarchy of plans, from national plans, to district plans, and local plans. This study analyze four types of plans, different in scale ranging from national level to detailed plans at the local level as detailed in Table 1. All these plans are spatial zoning statutory plans, which determine all aspects of land uses, building and construction, including building regulations, rights, and restrictions.

Table 1: The analyzed plans of Jerusalem

Type of plan	Year	Description
The National Outline Scheme #35 – Comprehensive National Outline Scheme for Building, Development and Conservation (Figure 1)	2006	Initiated by the National Planning Board and approved by the Israel Government in 2006. It is the current authorized statutory plan for Israel.
The District Plan #4 for the Jerusalem District (Figure 2)	2008	Initiated by the National Planning Board and approved by the Israel Government in 2008.
Jerusalem Outline Plan - No. 2000 (Figure 3) ⁴⁰	2005-2022	Initiated by Jerusalem Municipality
Neighborhood Detailed Plans (Figure 4)	1968-1991	15 zoning plans for settling Jews in East Jerusalem initiated by Jerusalem Municipality

Figure 1. The National Outline Scheme #35

⁴⁰ <https://www.jerusalem.muni.il/en/residents/planningandbuilding/cityplanning/masterplan/>




Figure 2. The District Plan #4 for the Jerusalem District




Figure 3. Jerusalem Outline Plan #2000





Figure 4. Detailed zoning plans for Jews and Palestinians neighborhoods in Jerusalem



Findings: Planning contribution to antagonism relations

The analysis of the plans is presented along the three logics as follows:

The imaginary logic

The national fantasy is represented in the spatial planning for Jerusalem at the national, district, and local scales by repetitive articulations of Jerusalem as a “whole”, “united”, and “ultimate capital” of Israel. The plans declare West Jerusalem and the occupied East Jerusalem as parts of a “unified” city.

The National Outline Scheme #35 manifests territorial and demographic national fantasies for Jerusalem that can be both understood as aspiring to ensure the future control over the occupied territory of East Jerusalem (Assif, 2008). In prescribing the district and local plans, the protection of a Jewish majority in

Jerusalem and its metropolitan region in the future, the National Outline Scheme #35 wishes to ensure the geopolitical fate of Jerusalem as a “united city” and “perpetual capital” of Israel.

In line with the National plan, the *District Plan of Jerusalem, T.A.M.A.M 1 Correction #30* proposes improvements of Jerusalem’s public image and strengthening its economy and culture in order to attract more Jewish residents. The stated demographic goal of the District plan is to keep the population ratio of 70% Jews and 30% Palestinians for the next 20 years by increasing the Jewish population and decreasing the population growth of the Palestinian population through an intensive policing of what it defines as illegal housing expansion.

At the city level, Jerusalem Outline Plan #2000 (*Jerusalem 2000*) states as its goals the creation of “a statutory framework to continue developing [Jerusalem] as the capital of Israel and a metropolitan center, while maintaining its unique characteristics and ensuring urban quality of life for its citizens” (Jerusalem Plan #2000, 2004: 7-8). Consistent with the national fantasy, and without problematizing its harsh divide into west – Jewish and east – Palestinian parts, the plan suggests to “strengthen the status of Jerusalem as Israel capital, as a center of the Jewish people and as a holy city for the three monolithic religions.”

The plans at these three scales present a fantasy of wholeness and harmony, of one city that represents the nation and the Jewish people while maintaining its significance for other religions. It is a fantasy of a complete and united city, whereas de facto, it is highly contentious and divided city (Bollens, 2000; Jabareen et al., 2019). By ignoring the disconnection between its parts and the uneven development that characterizes them (as clearly shown by the detailed plans) the Palestinians residents of Jerusalem are put, through planning means as the ‘others’, the ‘holes’ and ‘voids’; those that harm the fantasy of wholeness, completeness, and harmony.

The logic of difference

The conception of difference is to arrange urban society along social, race, ethnic, religious, and other affiliations. The division of people in planning can be identified already at the national and district plans. The National Outline Scheme # 35 divides the population of Israel and in Jerusalem into two major groups: Jews and Palestinians. Following these baseline differentiations, a major concern of *Jerusalem 2000* is the demographic growth of the Palestinian community vis-à-vis the Jewish community, the former is presented as a key threat to the city. The Plan (from 2004) suggests that “[...] if the current demographic trends continue in the future without change, the ratio in the year 2020 will be 60% Jews and 40% Arabs.” Therefore, according to the *Jerusalem 2000*:

The demographic trends forecasted for the year 2020 are influenced primarily by a set of political, economic, social and cultural factors, as they have been expressed and managed in recent years. **In order to change current trends and avoid serious future developments**, there is a drastic need for ways to address the main variables influencing the demographic migration balance and differences in fertility rates which ultimately produce the demographic balance. These variables include personal security, employment, housing, education, quality of environment, social and cultural life, municipal services, etc.” (*Jerusalem Plan #2000*, 2004: 204).

Jerusalem Outline Plan #2000, therefore, promotes an aggressive intervention of reducing outmigration of Jews from Jerusalem and to attract Jewish residents from other part of the country (p. 205). The text of *Jerusalem 2000* (p. 1) refers to the explicit demographic policy that “seeks to maintain a ratio of 70% Jews and 30% Arabs” therefore, “the master plan aims to maintain a significant Jewish majority in Jerusalem” (p. 204). At the same time the plan conceives the Palestinian neighborhoods in an antagonist way as “illegal,” “problematic,” “chaotic,” with “unclear land ownership,” and a failure in terms of efficient utilization of the land resources.

The logic of spatial equivalence

Establishing the very basic categories of difference across the planning scales – that of Arabs (Palestinians) and Jews, the plans produce various spatial chains of equivalence utilizing zoning and other planning tools to

achieve the demographic and geopolitical ends. The National Outline Scheme #35 fight the depletion of the Jewish population from the city by proposing an additional expansion of Jerusalem's municipal jurisdiction by 34,500 Dunums (one quarter of its size today), providing national economic and spatial incentives to attract Jews to the city and discourage the outmigration of Jewish families. Furthermore, the plan suggests increasing the density of Jerusalem by 12-24 dwellings per dunums to enhance its capability of housing provision for Jews.

The District Plan of Jerusalem, T.A.M.A.M 1 proposes a transportation that focuses on the interest of the Jewish settlements and neighborhoods not only within Jerusalem but in the wider region including the occupied territories. The system aims to 'unite' West-East Jerusalem by connecting Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem with the city and the region through a system of highways that slices the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and disconnects them. In conjunction with the Separation Wall, the transportation system constitutes physical borders detaching the Palestinian neighborhoods from each other, from the Western city and from the Jewish settlement neighborhoods in East Jerusalem – as a line of antagonism – while at the same time connecting the Jews settlements together (Gush Etzion, Ma'ale Adumim, E1, and Givat Ze'ev) (Adalah, 2008).

The *Jerusalem plan #2000* also takes part in spatially establishing the chains of equivalence and antagonistic lines between the two groups. It proposes different economic, social, and spatial strategies aimed at determining the demographic order of the city posing the "major challenges that the planning policy must meet" (p. 1) as "maintaining a solid Jewish majority in the City" (p. 2). The plan identifies "a number of central challenges [that] if met, would also meet the policy goals" of demographic balancing. To this end, its measures include:

- a) Establishing new neighborhoods for the Jews in the city.
- b) Providing additional housing through building and expansion of existing neighborhoods.
- c) Maintaining housing costs that are sufficiently reasonable to compete with the surrounding suburbs [due to outmigration of non-orthodox Jewish suburbs].
- d) Ensuring the quantity and quality of municipal services [for Jews].
- e) Creating a large number of desirable jobs.
- f) Ensuring good urban quality of life and a positive urban experience.

Jerusalem 2000 acknowledges that "the Arab population suffers from housing problems due to the significant size of the population and lack of financial resources", that the East neighborhoods lack "suitable engineering infrastructures" and public services and that there is an "absence of agreed and consistent policy" for planning eastern Jerusalem among the Israeli political and planning apparatus. Nevertheless, *Jerusalem 2000* does not provide any spatial planning strategies to mitigate these problems among the Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem. In this way, East Jerusalem, is defined by the plan as an antagonistic chain of equivalence that is highly problematic but that will be planned and resolved sometime in the future. The only direct measure proposed by the plan for East Jerusalem, enabling the "densification of the rural villages and densification and thickening of the existing urban neighborhoods and recommends a rehabilitation of the refugee camps within its borders" (*Jerusalem Plan no. 2000: Chapter 7 and 7.2*) is coupled with a main strategy of "firmly enforce the prohibition of illegal building, a phenomenon that is widespread within the Arab sector in the city".

Finally, *Jerusalem 2000* understands the "spatial segregation of the various population groups in the city [as] a real advantage. Every group has its own cultural space and can live its lifestyle. The segregation limits the potential sources of conflict between and among the various populations." This statement seems in sharp contrast with the fantasy of the united and unified Jerusalem. The city plan does not wish to eliminate the boundaries and divides that de facto exist based on three categories: (1) the ethnic identity: Jews and Palestinians; (2) religiosity of Jews: secular, religious nationalist, Orthodox; and (3) socioeconomic differentiation of the Jewish community. **Figure 5** represents the social spaces of Jerusalem based on these distinctive categories. With this figure it is possible to grasp the segregation lines that the Plan wishes to maintain, with the Green-Line (representing the area that was annexed after the 1967 war) most clearly

demarcates the line of antagonism between two chains of equivalence. The chain of equivalence includes the entire Jewish neighborhoods: The Ultra-Orthodox, the non-Ultra-Orthodox, low and high income, within and beyond the Green-Line. Beyond it are the “Others”; the Palestinians, with their neighborhoods seen only based on the national categories with no other categories of identity distinguishing between them.

Finally, the two detailed plans presented in figure 4, both approved in 1987, one for a Palestinian neighborhood and one for a Jewish settlement neighborhood in East Jerusalem, tell the story of planning as the producer and keeper of the chains of equivalence. The different treatment of planning – the well detailed plan for the Jewish neighborhood and the underdeveloped and lacking details plan for the Palestinian neighborhood shows how planning at the national, district and city scales is directly translated into spatial actions of producing social space. The abundant green areas in the Palestinian neighborhood plan are not developed as parks for the benefit of residents but solely constrain the development of the residential areas.

Figure 5. Social spaces in Jerusalem based on the spatial logic of difference and equivalence




Table 1. The framework of urban social spaces: its logics and their orientations, roles, and outcomes

<i>Logics</i>	<i>Orientations</i>	<i>Practices/role</i>	<i>Planning Manifestations</i>
The imaginary logic	Political and social	Envisioning the wholeness and the space of 'sovereign good'	United, 'wholeness' City, 'Our Capital,' the 'others', the Palestinian demography represented as dangerous to the 'wholeness.'
Logic of difference	Social	Constructing the 'we', the 'others' and the 'other others' based on social affiliations.	A clear distinction between competing categories based on a demographic challenge and strategies for dealing with the challenge
Logic of spatial equivalence	Social and spatial	Rearranging and formulating the urban space based	Differential planning (on all scales) for the different parts of the city. East Jerusalem is not treated by the plans maintaining these spaces outside the chain of equivalence

Conclusions

Applying the imaginary, difference, and equivalence logics to plans at four different scales, we unravel the relations between the political agenda as manifested in the fantasy of harmonious, uninterrupted "we" that is interlinked to the conception of the "other" that is perceived as a threat to the imagined united community. In our case study, the fantasy of Israel's unified, united, and Jewish capital city is threatened by the Palestinian population in what was repeatedly articulated as a demographic challenge. The logics of difference and equivalence underpin the differences of residents, differentiating between them and at the same time transcending and subverting various characteristics in order to constitute a 'collective' and 'complete' identity within a specific social space. With the logics of difference and equivalence as our analytical lens, we portray how planning outputs establish different social spaces, create affiliations among some, and draws clear antagonistic lines with other. Once established in plans, these antagonistic lines become highly immune to change. Planning envisions and directs the 'war of positions' of urban social spaces as well as affords and limits possibilities for their interrelations. With this understanding, we suggest that planning creates and maintains antagonistic lines, intentionally excludes spaces, and establishes them as voids instead of utilizing spatial strategies to eliminate social antagonism and establish the prospect of relations of recognition.

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