Beyond Confrontation: The Evolution of Planning through Negotiated Real Estate Development

Abstract

Discussions of real estate development often focus on describing developers, participants and outcomes, and the process is often seen as a "development game" where planners and developers are in opposition. In contrast to the traditional "top-down" planning approach, this study takes the entire process of equal negotiated planning process between the government and real estate developers, as a case study. By analyzing the reasons for negotiation failure, the aim is to use this as a research basis for expanding negotiated planning process to the field of statutory planning. This article takes the new development project of Changxing Island International Fishing Harbor Cultural and Tourism Town in Shanghai as an example. As a real estate investor, the researcher participated in the entire process of game negotiation with the local government. The Chinese real estate market uses the rate of cash flow returning to positive as an indicator of corporate profitability: the more area available for sale, the faster the rate of cash flow returning to positive. Local policies require developers to maintain a minimum percentage of commercial assets that cannot be sold but can only be operated, resulting in a lack of residential product and an oversupply of commercial product. The inability to change this "one-size-fits-all" policy was the root cause of the failed negotiations, resulting in negative investment returns for developers. While developers are often considered to pursue the maximization of their own private interests, planning conditions that balance the interests of all parties can still create outstanding comprehensive value for the local community. By extending negotiated planning, which in China operates more at the non-statutory planning, into the statutory planning arena, the planning process will shift from opposition to an equal dialogue mechanism that progressively harmonizes consensus.